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If successfully concluded, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) would be the
most ambitious free trade agreement in history. Dennis Novy writes that while the potential
beneﬁts from liberalised transatlantic trade are large, getting there will be an arduous process, with
signiﬁcant diﬃculties still to be overcome.
A plan to create a free trade area between the European Union (EU) and the United States – the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – was oﬃcially launched at the G8 summit in
Northern Ireland in June 2013. I was the specialist adviser on a recent parliamentary investigation
of the potential impact of TTIP and the likelihood that it will get oﬀ the ground.
Partly because of the sheer scale of TTIP – the EU and the United States together represent about 45 per cent of
global output – and partly because it will attempt to tackle non-tariﬀ barriers and regulation, the proposed megadeal
is potentially a ‘game changer’ for 21st century trade. But what would be its likely eﬀects on Europe in general?
Winners and losers from TTIP
A study by the Centre for Economic Policy Research indicates that in the best case TTIP scenario, the average EU
household of four could see its disposable income rise by €545 per year by 2027 as a result of lower prices and
higher productivity. But the degree of uncertainty involved in such predictions is immense, not least because they
depend on the extent of the agreement: will there be a comprehensive agreement with full liberalisation of non-tariﬀ
barriers or a ‘light’ agreement with not much more than a cut in tariﬀs?
We probably have a better sense of the cross industry gains and losses. It is likely that the car industry stands to
gain considerably from TTIP on both sides of the Atlantic. Not surprisingly, it is one of the best organised industries
in relation to TTIP. For the UK, other industries likely to gain include chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
But even if we believe that TTIP would be beneﬁcial for countries and consumers as a whole, there will inevitably be
losers. For example, highly protected parts of the Mediterranean agricultural industry might shrink once their tariﬀ
and non-tariﬀ barriers are removed. It is unclear how governments envisage mitigating these adverse eﬀects.
Losing the public debate
In any case, cold numbers will not win the hearts and minds of the electorate. The potential beneﬁts of TTIP are
likely to be diﬀuse while the costs will be concentrated. The lack of transparency surrounding the negotiations
creates further suspicion. Governments have to come up with much more convincing narratives and concrete
examples if they want to sway the public debate on TTIP. How would the average person beneﬁt from this trade
agreement? Why is it in the UK’s long-term interest to engage in such negotiations?
At the moment, in most EU countries, the debate centres on speciﬁc items such as whether Europeans will allow
chicken to be washed with chlorinated solution (as practiced in the United States), or whether international
arbitration panels as opposed to local courts will be allowed to resolve disputes. These issues are important and
deserve a proper public discussion. But in many cases, cherry-picked items have been hijacked by campaigners
with a certain political agenda. The public debate would beneﬁt from a more diverse and balanced discussion that
takes account of arguments both for and against TTIP.
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Sign at an anti-TTIP protest, Credit: Ruben Neugebauer / Campact (CC-BY-
SA-3.0)
Governments across the EU are broadly in favour of TTIP, but it seems that they are currently losing the public
debate. Communication cannot be left to the
European Commission alone. Governments should
engage more with their national electorates, and this
engagement needs to happen at all levels of
government, not only through trade and economics
ministers.
Important sticking points
A number of diﬃcult issues stand out as sticking
points. First, the core of TTIP negotiations is not
about tariﬀs but rather about aligning regulation and
removing non-tariﬀ barriers. A classic example is car
safety regulation. There is no evidence that cars are
less safe in either the EU or the United States. But
car manufacturers currently have to comply with two
diﬀerent sets of regulation. Removing duplicate
regulation would bring down production costs and
arguably consumer prices, even if this does not automatically generate new trade. While car safety is a common
sense issue, negotiators face many controversial issues, such as food safety regulation where many Europeans
perceive standards to be lower on the other side of the Atlantic.
Second, there is agriculture, which is traditionally considered a contentious area. For example, not all geographical
indications such as Parma ham and champagne will be recognised by the United States. Meat exports are another
diﬃcult issue. Third there is government procurement. Fair and open access to government contracts is supposed to
be an essential part of TTIP. But access is especially diﬃcult to obtain at the sub-federal level where the national
government might have less power to legislate. Some promising progress has been made by the EU on that front in
its recent free trade agreement with Canada.
Fourth, there is Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). ISDS is an enforcement mechanism that is supposed to
avoid discrimination against foreign companies. It is a particularly contentious issue in Europe, where a hostile
stance has been adopted by the German government, large parts of the German public and increasingly also in the
UK. Perhaps not surprisingly, ISDS is also an issue where a great deal of misinformation is inserted into the public
debate by antiglobalisation campaigners. Given these countries’ resistance to ISDS, there has been considerable
pressure on the EU to drop ISDS from the negotiations. But given that the EU typically insists on ISDS mechanisms
when negotiating trade agreements with lower income countries, it would smack of hypocrisy to oppose them when
negotiating with the United States.
Fifth, there is the issue of ﬁnancial services, which are a priority for the UK given their weight in the national
economy. But the United States strongly resists the inclusion of ﬁnancial services in TTIP, partly because it is
occupied with implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which seeks
to increase the safety of the ﬁnancial system in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008/09.
Sixth, there are geostrategic concerns. International trade in the modern world is increasingly about ‘making things’
and no longer as much about ‘selling things’. The rise of outsourcing and global value chains has fundamentally
transformed international trade and foreign direct investment. Governance is needed to regulate these trends.
Given the enormous size and clout of the EU and the United States, TTIP might be a forum where 21st century trade
rules are set. TTIP is supposed to be a ‘living agreement’ that creates a permanent dialogue for the future where
new regulation is discussed and implemented. In that sense, TTIP is not only an economic project but also a political
project to promote transatlantic ties. Given the rise of emerging economies, TTIP might be the last opportunity for
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individual EU members such as the UK to have a major impact on setting high standard global trade rules. The price
of failure might therefore be high.
Seventh, there are parallel developments and the role of China. In addition to TTIP, the United States is currently
negotiating the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP) with 11 other countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam). TPP is seen as more diﬃcult politically since it
involves low wage countries such as Vietnam. Issues of labour and environmental standards are likely to come up,
but these play less of a role in the TTIP negotiations. It has been suggested that TTIP and especially TPP are
designed to contain China – or at least to encourage China to engage more actively in global trade initiatives. TTIP
should not be a closed shop. Third countries should be allowed to participate and appropriate arrangements need to
be discussed.
Last, there is political uncertainty. TTIP involves an enormous political agenda and would be diﬃcult to handle even
in the best of circumstances. Additional complications arise from the changing political landscape on both sides of
the Atlantic. In the EU, the new European Parliament is likely to be less friendly towards international trade and
investment.
On the US side, the midterm elections in November 2014 took momentum away from the TTIP agenda. The US
administration is yet to secure ‘trade promotion authority’ from Congress, without which it cannot make serious
negotiating oﬀers. If no major progress is made in the narrow window of opportunity before the presidential election
cycle kicks in, then we might not see a successful conclusion of TTIP until 2017 or even 2020.
How can research contribute?
Evidence on the eﬀects of trade agreements is hard to produce. Nevertheless, there is strong demand for high‐
quality research. For example, it is frequently claimed that trade liberalisation leads to lower consumer prices. While
it is easy to produce theoretical models with this result, it is harder to show this convincingly in the data. Prices can
move for dozens of reasons, and international trade is only one potential factor. Furthermore, there is not enough
research focus on non-tariﬀ barriers such as diﬀerential regulation. These barriers are typically much harder to
measure than tariﬀs, but businesses clearly perceive them as the biggest impediment to free trade.
Finally, some aspects of political economy have received relatively little attention in trade research. For example,
there is sometimes a mismatch between negotiators. Many US representatives tend to be ‘technocrats’, often
lawyers, who have in-depth expertise on speciﬁc issues such as regulation. In contrast, their EU counterparts might
be political appointees who delegate speciﬁc issues to expert aides. As a result of this imbalance, it can be hard to
make substantive progress.
TTIP has the potential to beneﬁt millions of consumers. It goes far beyond an economic project. Its current timetable
seems ambitious. Without considerable attention and support from the highest levels of government, it will be hard
to lead TTIP to a successful conclusion any time soon.
This article originally appeared in the print issue of CentrePiece, the magazine of the Centre for Economic
Performance (CEP) at LSE.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP– European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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